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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [KUNR](#) [NI](#) [UNSC](#) [UNGA](#)

SUBJECT: CHINESE AMBASSADOR TO NIGERIA CONFIRMS NIGERIA'S PUSH FOR AU-G4 COMPROMISE

REF: A. USUN NEW YORK 1657

[TB](#). ABUJA 1154  
[TC](#). ABUJA 1250

Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).

[¶1.](#) (C) On the afternoon of July 22, Chinese Ambassador to Nigeria Wang Yongqiu visited the Ambassador to discuss UNSC reform. He told the Ambassador he had met with the Acting Permanent Secretary of Nigeria's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Mr. Asiru (phonetic), the previous afternoon, and that Asiru had confirmed Nigeria's plans to push the AU into a compromise with the G-4 on UNSC reform (Ref A). Wang said that Asiru had told him that the Foreign Minister and the regular MFA PermSec were already in New York, and that both would attend the Ministerial-level meeting in London on July [¶25](#).

[¶2.](#) (C) Wang said that China would be canvassing the AU countries for their responses to President Obasanjo's letter, in his capacity as AU President, requesting their approval for a compromise to the AU resolution calling for two permanent UNSC seats for Africa. The deadline for individual country responses was Sunday, July 24, he said, and asked if the U.S. would canvas AU heads of state for their responses as well.

[¶3.](#) (C) According to Wang, Asiru was "confident that most AU countries would say yes" to Obasanjo's request for a compromise of some sort between the G-4 and the AU. However, Wang said that China thought most AU members would not agree to Obasanjo's letter, but instead hold out for more concessions from the G-4. Nonetheless, if Obasanjo was successful in gaining AU support, the outcome of the ministerial meeting in London would be a G4-AU compromise resolution to be presented to the UNGA by the end of July. Drafting of the compromise resolution would be done by the "four plus four," Wang said: the four ministers from the G-4, and four from the AU.

[¶4.](#) (C) Wang raised whether the P-5 ambassadors should approach Obasanjo in order to express the P-5's strong opposition to the G4-AU compromise. The Ambassador replied that the U.S. had repeated its message opposing the G-4 resolution to the GON several times (Refs B and C), and he and Wang agreed that the GON was already quite aware of the P-5's objections.

[¶5.](#) (C) The Ambassador agreed to pass along China's suggestion to canvas AU heads of state for their response to Obasanjo's letter. Wang thanked the Ambassador and said, "It is in our interest to keep these groups (the G-4 and the AU) from coming together."

[¶6.](#) (C) Comment: The GON, of course, knows the U.S. position on Security Council expansion, as well as our objections to the G-4 draft. Perhaps for that reason, GON officials have not been forthcoming about the operational details of their campaign to reach a compromise between the G-4 and the AU. They have not mentioned to us a July 25 London meeting of G-4 and AU ministers, for example. End Comment.

CAMPBELL